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Abstract:  We study the Nash Equilibrium of three-candidate unidimensional spatial competition when 
candidates differ in their non-policy characteristics (valence).  If the voters' policy preferences are represented by 
a strictly convex loss function, and if the voter density is unimodal and symmetric, then a unique, modulo 
symmetry, local Nash Equilibrium exists under fairly plausible conditions.  The global Nash Equilibrium, 
however, exists when only one candidate has a valence advantage (or disadvantage) while the other two 
candidates have the same valence. 
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 1 Introduction1
The median voter theorem (Hotelling 1929; Downs 1957; and Black 1958) is one of
the most widely used results in analytical political economy. In a setup also known
as the Hotelling-Downs model, the theorem states that two-candidate unidimensional
spatial competition has a unique pure strategy Nash Equilibrium (PSNE) in which
both candidates adopt the policy most preferred by the median voter. In the model,
there is a continuum of voters. The voting is sincere, non-stochastic, and without
abstention. The candidates are vote-maximizing, and they may di⁄er only in their
policies; otherwise they are identical. Although the model is commonly used to
study two-candidate competition when candidates are homogeneous, it cannot be
easily extended to other cases: More speci￿cally, the PSNE does not exists when the
candidates have di⁄erent non-policy characteristics (also known as valence) in two-
candidate competition2, nor when three homogeneous candidates compete (Eaton
and Lipsey 1975). In this paper, however, we show that a unique (modulo symmetry)
PSNE exists when one considers competition among three candidates with valence
di⁄erences.
In our base model (presented in Section 2) we impose two main restrictions on
the standard Hotelling-Downs model: Voters￿policy preferences are represented by a
strictly convex loss function; and the density of voters is both unimodal and symmet-
ric. We then show that a (modulo symmetry) unique Local Nash Equilibrium (LNE)
exists for a large set of valence parameters. The set of parameters for which the PSNE
exists is smaller, yet it is non-empty. For a symmetric density of voters, the PSNE
exists only when two of the three competing candidates have the same valence, and
the valence di⁄erence between these candidates and the third one exceeds a certain
threshold. That is, for PSNE to exists, two of the three candidates must have the
1I would like to thank ‚ Sule Atahan-Evrenk, Darlene Chisholm, Tim Groseclose, Hsueh-Ling
Hyunh, Dilip Mookherjee, and J￿rgen Weibull for comments. All errors are mine
2For a partial list of people who established this claim, see (Groseclose 2001, footnote 10).
1same appeal, and the appeal of the third candidate must be su¢ ciently di⁄erent from
the appeal of the other two. Further, under an alternative set of assumptions, such
as asymmetric voter density or plurality-maximizing candidates, the PSNE exists for
a much larger set of parameters including cases where each candidate has di⁄erent
valence.
We ￿nd that the location of candidates in equilibrium depends on the number of
the candidate(s) with the highest valence. When only one candidate, say Candidate
2, has higher valence than the rest, in any LNE, Candidate 2 locates between the two
lower-valence candidates (Candidates 1 and 3). Candidates 1 and 3 locate equidis-
tantly from the center, and receive the same vote share. Candidate 2 is located closer
to the candidate with the second highest valence. A PSNE for this case does not
exist unless Candidates 1 and 3 have the same valence. In the PSNE, Candidate 2 is
located at the center.
When two of the candidates have the same valence and the third one has a lower
valence, the former candidates choose the same policy platform on one side of the
center, receiving the same vote share. The lower valence candidate locates at the
other side of (and further away from) the center. His vote share is lower than that of
the other two candidates.3
We characterize both the LNE and the PSNE of the base model for a general
strictly convex loss function (that is, for a general strictly concave utility function).
We show that the quadratic loss function, commonly used in models of two-candidate
competition, restricts the set of candidate valences under which an LNE exists; it
rules out many plausible equilibria. This does not happen under many other loss
functions.
When we consider some modi￿cations of the base model, such as plurality max-
imizing candidates or asymmetric voter density, we ￿nd that the LNE of the base
model is also an LNE in these models. More important, in these models PSNE exists
3When all three candidates have the same valence, we return to competition between three
identical candidates, and neither a PSNE nor an LNE exists.
2for a much larger set of parameters including the case in which none of the candidates
have the same valence. Although both the model and its extensions mentioned above
are quite stylized, they have two advantages. Both the LNE and the PSNE (i) are
unique (modulo symmetry) when they exist, and (ii) can be characterized analyti-
cally. Thus, for instance, the model could be used for comparative statics concerning
both marginal and large changes in candidate valences.4 Further, given the existence
of a unique equilibrium with an analytical solution, the model could also serve as a
benchmark case for understanding the e⁄ects of additional modelling assumptions,
such as probabilistic voting, on the equilibrium outcome.
Lin, Enelow and Dorussen (1999) considers spatial competition among homoge-
nous candidates under probabilistic voting. They prove that when the variance of the
uncertainty about the voting decision is large enough, there exists a PSNE. However,
in this PSNE all candidates locate at the mean of the voter density. Two recent book-
length treatments of multi-party competition, Adams, Merrill and Grofman (2005),
and Scho￿eld and Sened (2006), study detailed models of probabilistic voting. These
models predict party divergence in equilibrium. Adams, Merrill and Grofman (2005)
considers features such as party loyalty, policy discounting, and abstention in a uni-
dimensional setup. Scho￿eld and Sened (2006) has an integrated and more detailed
approach. They study models of policy making that include many factors such as
post election bargaining, activist valence, party principals, and a multi-dimensional
policy space. Characterizing PSNE of these models in analytical form is not possible
in general; the authors estimate the equilibrium using simulations based on country
speci￿c estimates of several parameters in their models. Adams (1999) runs simula-
tions to calculate the PSNE of a more stylized model: three candidate competition
4For instance, Evrenk (2004) studies the support for anti-corruption reforms in a setup with
three candidates who di⁄er both in the level of their honesty and ability. The reform will raise the
minimum level of honesty among the candidates, and thus will change the valence vector signi￿cantly.
A candidate￿ s support for the reform depends on the change in his vote shares before and after the
reform. When we have an equilibrium in analytical form both before and after the reform, one can
determine the sign of the change in vote share.
3with valence di⁄erences under probabilistic voting and uniform voter density. The
structure of the equilibrium in his Figures 2B and 2C look similar to the equilibrium
locations that we ￿nd in Propositions 1 and 2 without probabilistic voting.5
Chisik and Lemke (2006) studies a model of simultaneous move unidimensional
spatial competition among three homogeneous candidates without probabilistic vot-
ing. They prove that under a uniform density a continuum of PSNE exists when one
assumes that candidates care only about winning a majority of votes. This, however,
is a strong assumption. It implies that a candidate is indi⁄erent between receiving a
49 percent vote share and no vote at all, if another candidate receives 50 percent of
votes in both situations. Hug (1995) studies PSNE of three-party competition when
there is uncertainty about the policy that a party will implement, ￿ extending Enelow
and Hinich (1984, section 7.4) to three-party competition. This model is isomorphic
to a special case of the model we study, as we discuss in greater detail at the end of
Section 2.
2 The model
Consider an Hotelling-Downs model of political competition where each candidate
j 2 f1;2;3g chooses a policy platform, pj, from R. Unlike the standard model, we
assume that each candidate j has exogenous non-policy characteristics (known as
valence and denoted by vj 2 R) favored by voters, such as competency, honesty, and
charisma.6 There is a continuum of voters (of measure one), and i denotes the voter
whose most preferred policy platform is i 2 R. Voting is sincere: i votes for candidate
j who provides the highest U
j
i (pj;vj), and randomizes when there are more than one
such j￿ s, where
5However, using these simulations and our results, one cannot identify how probabilistic voting
would a⁄ect the equilibrium. Because, under the uniform voter density used in these simulations,
no equilibrium exists without probabilistic voting.
6For more on valence, see Stokes (1963).
4U
j
i (pj;vj) = ￿L(ji ￿ pjj) + vj: (1)
In (1), L(x) : R+ ! R+ is the ￿loss function￿representing the voter￿ s policy prefer-
ences, and ji ￿ pjj is the distance between i and the policy platform of candidate j.
Let f(i) : I ! R+ denote the the density of i. We assume that: (A1) The loss func-
tion, L(:), is twice continuously di⁄erentiable and strictly convex with L0(0) = 0 and
limx!1 L0(x) = 1; (A2) The domain of the density is (i) closed, convex and symmet-
ric around zero, and the density is (ii) continuous, (iii) symmetric with f(i) = f(￿i),
(iv) di⁄erentiable on all its domain with the possible exceptions at zero and supI,
(at these points we assume that at least the directional derivatives exist), and (v)
unimodal; (A3) Each candidate j simultaneously chooses his policy platform to max-
imize his vote share, Vj(pj;p￿j).
We study the Nash Equilibria of the above model in which each candidate receives
a non-zero vote share, ￿ if a candidate receives no votes in equilibrium, his policy plat-
form does not matter for any practical purposes. The existence of a global equilibrium
is hard to verify, so, we follow a method proposed in Scho￿eld (2005). We ￿rst identify






￿j) over a (small) " neighborhood of p￿
j. We, then, use simulations
to check if a given LNE is a PSNE.7
We normalize candidate valences as v2 ￿ v1 ￿ v3. Then, the following cases are
collectively exhaustive and mutually exclusive; (a) v1 = v2 = v3, (b) v2 > v1 > v3,
(c) v2 > v1 = v3, and (d) v2 = v1 > v3. Let ￿j denote the valence di⁄erence between
Candidate 2, and Candidate j, i.e., v2 ￿ vj. Case (a) with no valence di⁄erence
is the same as the competition between three identical candidates, and therefore
has no LNE. For the other cases, we ￿nd that the number of candidate(s) with the
highest valence determines the structure of the equilibrium policy platforms. When
7Scho￿eld (2005) works from Local Strict Nash Equilibrium, LSNE, to PSNE. In our model,
however, LNE and LSNE coincide generically.
5one candidate has higher valence than the rest, i.e., cases (b) and (c), we have the
following result.
Proposition 1 When v2 > v1, if the LNE exists, then it is unique modulo symmetry,
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For non-zero vote shares we need p￿
3 < supI.
Remark 1 When v2 > v1 = v3, the LNE becomes [￿L￿1(￿1);0;L￿1(￿3)], and the





Next, we consider case (d). Let F(i) denote the cumulative density of i, and let z
be de￿ned by8 F(z) =
F(z+L￿1(￿3))
2 .
Proposition 2 When v2 = v1 > v3, if the LNE exists, then it is unique modulo
symmetry, and is given by [z;z;z + L￿1(￿3)]. A necessary (su¢ cient) condition for
the existence is f(z) ￿ (>)2f(z + L￿1(￿3)).
We prove Propositions 1 and 2 in the Appendix. Here we ￿rst discuss the equi-
librium locations and the vote shares. When one candidate has higher valence than
the others, the lower-valence candidates are located symmetrically around the mean,
p￿
1 = ￿p￿
3. Note that this is true even when the candidates 1 and 3 have unidentical
valence, i.e., in case (b). The high-valence candidate always locates in between the
lower-valence candidates. The higher-valence candidate locates exactly at the center
only when both of the lower-valence candidates have the same valence. Otherwise, he
locates at the same side of the center as the second highest valence candidate does.
When two of the candidates have exactly the same valence, and the third one has
a lower valence, case (d), the policy platforms of high-valence candidates converge,
8To ensure the existence and uniqueness of z, a su¢ cient condition is that the valence di⁄erence
is small, more precisely, F(￿L￿1(￿3)) < 1
4. To see that under this assumption there exists a unique
z 2 (￿L￿1(￿3);0], note that the function D(z) = 2F(z) ￿ F(z + L￿1(￿3)) is continuous with
D(￿L￿1(￿3)) < 0, D(0) ￿ 0, and D0(z) = 2f(z) ￿ f(z + L￿1(￿3)) > 0.
6p￿
1 = p￿
2. However, they do not converge on the center. These two candidates locate
on one side of the center and the third (lower-valence) candidate locates on the other
side. The unimodal and symmetric voter density implies that the higher-valence
candidates￿platform is closer to the center, i.e., jzj < jz + L￿1(￿3)j.
Given the equilibrium locations, we can calculate equilibrium vote shares. As
Lemma 2 in Appendix shows, in any LNE, all voters located between a low valence
candidate and a high valence candidate vote for the latter. Thus, in (b) and (c),
low valence candidates receive V ￿
1 = V ￿
3 = F(
￿L￿1(￿3)￿L￿1(￿1)
2 ), where Candidate 2
receives the rest of the votes, V ￿
2 = 1 ￿ 2F(
￿L￿1(￿3)￿L￿1(￿1)
2 ). Similarly, in (d), V ￿
3 =
1￿F(z+L￿1(￿3)), and each of the high valence candidates receives 1
2F(z+L￿1(￿3)),
or, equivalently, F(z), fraction of votes. The LNE vote shares in cases (b) and (c)
can not be further ordered. For instance, depending on ￿1 in some equilibria V ￿
1 is
less than V ￿
2 and in some other equilibria V ￿
1 is larger than V ￿
2 .9 In case (d), we can
rank the equilibrium vote shares of all candidates: since jzj < jz + L￿1(￿3)j, each
high-valence candidate receives a larger vote share than the candidate with the lower
valence, V ￿
1 = V ￿
2 > V ￿
3 . It is also worth noting that in cases (b) and (c), the low
valence candidates are not locally competing with each other in the equilibrium. That
is to say, when one of them locally deviates from his equilibrium platform, then the
vote share of the other low valence candidate remains unchanged. In contrast, in case
(d) when the low valence candidate locally deviates from his LNE location, the vote
share of all candidates change.
Before we study when LNE is PSNE, let us note an implication of the quadratic
loss function speci￿cation on LNE. Quadratic loss function has been used extensively
in the literature on two-candidate competition with valence di⁄erences, (Groseclose
(2001) is a notable exception); when the loss function is quadratic, it is quite easy to
calculate the location of the indi⁄erent voter analytically. Yet, using this speci￿cation
in three-candidate competition restricts the set of valence di⁄erences under which an
9As we discuss below, in PSNE we can always order the vote shares.
7LNE exists, ruling out many plausible LNE. To see why, let us compare the set of
LNE under L(x) = x2 with the same set under L(x) = x4, ￿ or, for that matter,
under any L(x) = x2n where n is an integer larger than one. Both loss functions
satisfy A1, but L00(0) = 2 in the former and L00(0) = 0 in the latter. To see how
the value of L00(0) imposes a lower bound on the set of valence di⁄erences, ￿j￿ s,
under which an equilibrium exists, consider the following voter densities that di⁄er




2￿e￿x2=2￿2 for x 2 R, (ii) Symmetric Exponential, f2(x;￿) = ￿
2e￿jxj￿
for x 2 R, and (iii) Symmetric Zero-mode Triangular, f3(x;b) de￿ned as b+x
b2 for
x 2 [￿b;0], and as b￿x




[L0(L￿1(￿1))]2 for (i), ￿ ￿
L00(0)




(iii). Note that the larger the L00(0), the larger is the minimum valence di⁄erence,
￿j, that satisfy these inequalities: When L00(0) = 0, there exists an LNE for any
0 < ￿ < L(supI). Yet, when L00(0) = 2, the LNE does not exists under small valence
di⁄erences. We need 1
22=3 < ￿ < L(supI) for f1(x;1), 1
2 < ￿ < L(supI) for f2(x;1),
and 1
4 < ￿ < L(supI) for f3(x;1). Thus,
Remark 2 Although under any strictly convex loss function with L00(0) = 0 the LNE
exists for any ￿ > 0, when L00(0) = 2, one needs the variance of the voter density to
converge to in￿nity for this to happen.
Since the variance of the voter density is a parameter over which the modeler has
the least control, the constraint pointed out in Remark 2 is especially important when
one considers actual voter data. Even more important, the set of valence parameters
(and thus the LNE) ruled out by the quadratic speci￿cation contain many plausible
equilibria. For instance, when voter density is f3(x;1) we are immediately ruling out
any LNE where the high valence candidate receives a vote share less than 3
4.
In case (d), to calculate the equilibrium locations in analytical form, we need a
cumulative density in analytical form.10 Then, one can identify the set of valence
10Thus, under the Gaussian density one cannot calculate the equilibrium locations analytically,
8di⁄erences that give rise to a non-zero vote share LNE as well: ￿3 > L(
Log[25=8]
￿ ) for
f2(x;￿), and L((2 ￿
p
2)b) < ￿3 < L(b) for f3(x;b). Unlike (b) and (c), in case
(d) the boundaries of the LNE locations does not depend on the curvature of the
loss function and are solely determined by the valence di⁄erences. In other words,
independent of L(:), p￿
1 = p￿
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3 ;0) for f3(x;b).
After identifying the LNE, now we can study the PSNE.
Proposition 3 The PSNE exists only in cases (c) and (d).
Proof. To see why there is no PSNE in (b), assume that an LNE with p￿
2 < 0 is
PSNE (one can use symmetric arguments to show that an LNE with p￿
2 > 0 can






1 = V ￿
3 = F(p￿
1). But, if Candidate 1 deviates to p0
1 = p￿
3, then all the voters located
at the right side of p￿
3 vote for him, since v1 > v3. In addition to these voters, some
of the voters located at the immediate left of p￿
3 also vote for him. That is because
now there is a candidate with higher valence located at p￿
3, thus the voter who is
indi⁄erent between Candidate 2 and the candidate at p￿
3 is located somewhere at the
left of p￿








contradicting that the LNE was a PSNE. To show PSNE exists in cases (c) and (d),
we provide examples: Consider f3(x;1). Using simulations one can show that in case
(c), when L(x) = x4, for any valence di⁄erence, ￿1, in [0:012;1] the PSNE exists, and
when L(x) = x2 all LNE is PSNE, i.e., there is a PSNE under any 1
4 < ￿1 < 1. In
case (d), under both quartic and quadratic loss functions, any LNE is PSNE.
Although in two-candidate competition the PSNE does not exist when one can-
didate has valence advantage, in three-candidate competition, the PSNE exist when
only one candidate has a valence advantage (or, a valence ￿disadvantage￿ ), i.e., cases








￿b ￿ L￿1(￿3) +
p
￿2b2 + 8bL￿1(￿3) ￿ 2(L￿1(￿3))2
￿
for f3(x;b).
9(c) and (d). Furthermore, the size of the valence di⁄erence between this candidate
and the other two candidates must be larger than a threshold that depends on, among
other things, the density of voters and the curvature of the loss function. Since the
PSNE is a subset of the LNE, PSNE is unique modulo symmetry, and can be char-
acterized analytically.
The method by which we calculate the equilibrium has restrictions on the analysis.
We can characterize equilibrium locations analytically, but we cannot analytically
check which ones are PSNE. For this, we use numerical simulations.11 With this
method we can provide examples of PSNE under many speci￿c densities, however,
unlike the LNE, we are unable to provide su¢ cient conditions for the existence of
PSNE that would apply to any density that satis￿es A2 (i)-(v). Neither can we
show that the PSNE exists for any such density. Such conditions are provided in
Hug (1995) for a special case of this model, however, there are problems with these
conditions.
Hug (1995) does not address competition with valence di⁄erences, however, the
mathematical structure of the model studied there is isomorphic to a special case
of the base model in this paper. He examines the PSNE of unidimensional political
competition among three parties when there is uncertainty about the policy platforms
of parties, ￿ an extension of Enelow and Hinich (1984, section 7.4) to three parties. In
that model, the platform chosen by party k is perceived with the same noise by all
the voters. More formally, when party k locates on ￿k 2 R, each voter expects party
k to implement the lottery ￿k +"k, where "k is an independent random variable with
zero mean and standard deviation ￿k. As Enelow and Hinich (1984), Hug (1995) also
assumes that the voter whose most preferred policy platform, or bliss point, is i 2 R
has a quadratic loss utility function, Ui(￿k) = ￿(i￿￿k)2. Then, the expected utility
of voter i from party k located at ￿k is ￿(xi ￿ ￿k)2 ￿ ￿2
k: when the loss function
is quadratic, the e⁄ect of uncertainty is reduced to one parameter, the variance. In
11For all simulations, Mathematica notebooks with calculations are available from the author.
10Hug (1995), the density of voters, f(xi), is twice di⁄erentiable, continuous, symmetric
around zero, strictly increasing on (￿1;0). Thus, his model of policy uncertainty
is isomorphic to a model of political competition with valence di⁄erences, where
L(x) = x2, I = R, and f(:) twice di⁄erentiable everywhere.
In Propositions 1 and 2, Hug (1995) claims to ￿nd su¢ cient conditions for PSNE
in all cases of present interest: (b), (c), and (d). As the proof of Proposition 2 should
make clear, the claim about case (b) is incorrect: the author does not check for the
global deviation by the candidate with the second highest valence, that is, p0
1 = p￿
3.
The claim about PSNE in case (c) must also be corrected: as we show the PSNE exists,
but the conditions that the author claims as su¢ cient for PSNE are not su¢ cient
even for an LNE. This is because, the second-order condition (the last equation on
page 179) is incorrect. For the correct su¢ cient conditions for LNE, note that the













1) into the setup the
author studies. Similar to case (b), the author claims that when other candidates are
located at their equilibrium platforms, for any f(i), one can analytically show that
the vote share of the high-valence candidate is maximized in his policy platform at
the relevant region, i.e., p0
2 2 (p￿
2;p￿
2 + L￿1(￿3)). However, for neither (c) nor (d),
could we prove this.12
The model we use is a variant of the Hotelling-Downs model and it, too, is stylized.
In the unique equilibrium of the Hotelling-Downs model, both candidates choose the
same policy and each receives exactly the same vote share. The PSNE of the model
we study has two non-plausible features as well. First, the PSNE does not exist for the
most likely case, (b). Second, in the PSNE of case (c), the highest valence candidate
always receives a majority of votes (V ￿
2 > 1
2).13 To see why, note that in any LNE in
12For instance, in the proof of Proposition 2, Hug (1995, p. 177), the argument for the existence of
equilibrium in (d) is that, using our notation, for any p0
2 2 (p￿
2;p￿
2+L￿1(￿3)), the function V2(p2;p￿
￿2)
has at most one critical value. This, we could not prove or disprove for the case he studies. We can
show, on the other hand, that when the loss function is quadratic as in Hug (1995), the density is
given by f2(x;1), and the valence/variance di⁄erence is equal to Log[25
8 ]2 (or slightly larger than
this), the vote share function has two critical points.
13The PSNE of other three-candidate competition models with non-stochastic voting has similar
11(c), the high valence candidate is located at the origin and the two other low valence
candidates are located equidistantly on both sides. Suppose that we have a PSNE
where the high valence candidate does not receive a majority of votes, then he could
simply deviate to the location of one of the low valence candidates and receive a vote
share that is strictly larger than one half. As we discuss in the next section, under
alternative assumptions these features disappear.
3 Discussion and Conclusion
In this section, we brie￿ y discuss three related issues. First, we examine the role of
the assumptions A1, A2 and A3 in establishing the equilibrium. Second, we consider
if (and how) these assumptions could be relaxed or altered without eliminating the
equilibrium. And, third, we identify how the PSNE of the modi￿ed model di⁄ers from
the PSNE of the base model. Here, we consider only the alternative assumptions
under which the LNE of the model is a superset of the LNE of the base model. Then,
we conclude.
We assume that the voter preferences are strictly concave (the loss function is
strictly convex), A1. With a linear loss function, even an LNE does not exist in any
of the cases.14 Under a strictly concave loss function, even if it exists, the equilibrium
is supported by an unusual pattern of voting: both the center voters and the voters
located around the supremum and in￿mum of I, i.e., the far-right and the far-left
voters, always vote for the center candidate.
We impose several conditions on the voter density. These assumptions are suf-
￿cient, not necessary, and sometimes are just convenient. Consider the assumption
strong conclusions. For instance, in Chisik and Lemke (2006) in every equilibrium, one candidate
receives more than a majority of votes. For other examples see Adams (2001, p.39-40)
14The reason is as follows. With a linear loss function, the low-valence candidates still choose the
locations of indi⁄erence, i.e., Lemma 2 applies. However, if a high valence candidate moves slightly
towards the low-valence candidate, then all the voters who voted for the latter will switch to the
former. Since by moving slightly towards a low-valence candidate, the high-valence candidate￿ s loss
of vote share from the voters on the other side is in￿nitesimal, such a deviation always increases his
vote share, and thus an LNE does not exist.
12that the voter density is unimodal, A2 (v). While this assumption is not neces-
sary, it is not as strong as what one needs for PSNE in standard Downsian spatial
multi-candidate competition: ￿..the number of ￿rms does not exceed twice the num-
ber of nodes,￿ (Eaton and Lipsey 1974, p.35). To see how unimodality simpli￿es
the condition for the existence of LNE, note that using (3), the su¢ cient condition









right-hand side cannot be negative. Thus, if we want to construct a density where
these su¢ cient conditions hold generically, then f0(x) should decrease around p￿
3, and
should increase around p￿
1. The density need not to be strictly decreasing on each
side of the mean. For example, both LNE and PSNE would exist under a density
￿rst decreasing on each side of the mean, then having a su¢ ciently small local mode
su¢ ciently far from the mean. However, with such densities, there will be ￿holes￿in
the set of valence di⁄erences that gives rise to the LNE, making the characterization
of LNE (and, for instance, the discussion of the impact of a quadratic loss function
on LNE) especially cumbersome.
We also assume that voters are distributed symmetrically around the mean, A2
(iii). The symmetric density, however, has strong implications on both the existence
of PSNE and the structure of equilibrium platforms: Under symmetry, a PSNE ex-
ists only when the vector of candidate valences has a certain kind of symmetry and
a certain degree of asymmetry. Unlike cases (c) and (d) where two of the three can-
didates have the same valence, there is no symmetry in candidate valences (and thus
no PSNE) in case (b).15 Since (b) is the most likely case, the PSNE under asym-
metric densities must be considered. The analysis of equilibrium under a general
asymmetric density is di¢ cult: to study PSNE under an asymmetric density, one has
to impose more structure on the density.16 Through examples we are able to show
15Note that the important step in the proof of Proposition 3 uses the fact that both lower-valence
candidates receive the same vote share in equilibrium, an implication of symmetric density, (see (3)).
However, also note that the symmetry of voter density does not require full symmetry in candidate
valences, as in case (a), either. Furthermore, under any valence distribution that is close to full
symmetry there is no PSNE either, cf. the examples in the proof of Proposition 3.
16The symmetric structure is analytically convenient because it imposes a structure. Asymmetry,
13that the PSNE in case (b) exists under asymmetric voter densities: assume that (i)
f(x) = 1+2x for ￿1
2 ￿ x ￿ 0 and f(x) = 1￿ 2
3x for ￿0 ￿ x ￿ 3






￿1. Then one can show that for any
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density is not the only solution; another way to restore the equilibrium in case (b) is
to consider alternative candidate motivations.
We assume that candidates are vote-maximizing, A3. Although A3 is the most
commonly used objective function in models of multi-candidate competition, it may
imply paradoxical behavior: ￿when there are more [than two] candidates: a candidate
who wins outright may, if she moves her position closer to that of a neighbor, increase
the number of votes that she receives but at the same time increase the number
of voters received by her other neighbor enough that she is no longer the outright
winner￿ , (Osborne 1995, p. 278). To check if the equilibrium we ￿nd is supported
by this kind of behavior, we calculate both the LNE and PSNE of the model under
the assumption that each candidate j maximizes his plurality,17 PLUj(p1;p2;p3) =
Vj(p1;p2;p3)￿maxk6=jfVk(p1;p2;p3)g. We ￿nd that such a paradoxical behavior does
not occur in the LNE we ￿nd. Further, we ￿nd that
Proposition 4 Under plurality maximization, (i) the policy platforms in Proposi-
tions 1 and 2 are still LNE, and (ii) now PSNE exists in every case except (a).
Proposition 4 is proved in the Appendix. We do not provide a full characterization
of Nash equilibrium under plurality maximization here, as our purpose is to note that
the equilibria we ￿nd in Section 2 are robust. It is worth noting that when each
candidate maximizes his plurality, there exists a PSNE in the most likely case, (b).
This is because, a high(er)-valence candidate, such as Candidate 1 in case (b), could
however, simply implies a lack of structure. Then, to study the model with an asymmetric density,
the researcher needs to impose some structure. For example, studying the equilibrium under a
certain asymmetric Triangular distribution is relatively straightforward, but studying it under any
asymmetric distribution is di¢ cult.
17The following discussion would apply under the assumption of complete plurality maximization,
CPM, as well. For a de￿nition of CPM, see Cox (1987).
14increase his vote share by deviating to the position of a low-valence candidate, however
such a move would reduce his plurality. For this reason, the LNE for smaller valence
di⁄erences in cases (c) and (d), along with many of the LNE for case (b), survives
the test for PSNE.
In this paper, we study both the local and the global Nash Equilibrium of three-
candidate competition in standard Downsian model with exogenous candidate va-
lence. We show that, for a large set of valence di⁄erences, a modulo symmetry unique
LNE with an analytical characterization exists. We also show that the commonly used
quadratic loss speci￿cation signi￿cantly restricts the set of parameters under which
an LNE exists. For a PSNE to exist, the valence di⁄erences need more structure. The
PSNE of the base model does not exists in case (b), however, this feature disappears
when one considers either asymmetric voter density, or plurality maximizing candi-
dates. In PSNE of case (c), Candidate 2 receives a majority of votes. Under plurality
maximization, this feature also disappears; when candidates are plurality maximizing
in (still modulo symmetry unique) PSNE, the center candidate does not necessarily
receive a majority of the votes. Interestingly, this PSNE in which V ￿
2 < 1
2 is sup-
ported by another type of paradoxical behavior: in such an equilibrium, Candidate
2 does not move towards a low valence candidate as this would reduce his plurality,
even though the move would secure him a majority. It is possible to impose other
assumptions such as probabilistic voting where both features disappears. A detailed
analysis of these cases is left for future research.
4 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. To prove Proposition 1, we need the following three
Lemmas. Consider competition between two candidates, j and k, where vj > vk. Let
I(pj;pk) 2 R denote a location of indi⁄erence, i.e., L(jI(pj;pk) ￿ pjj)￿L(jI(pj;pk) ￿ pkj) =
vj ￿vk. Obviously when pj = pk all voters prefer candidate j, thus I(pj;pk) does not
15exist. However,
Lemma 1 Whenever candidates choose non-identical policy platforms, (i) there al-
ways exists a unique location of indi⁄erence (Groseclose 2005, Appendix III), and (ii)
I(pj;pk) is closer to the candidate with lower valence.
Proof. For (ii) note that vj ￿ vk > 0 implies that L(jI(pj;pk) ￿ pjj) >
L(jI(pj;pk) ￿ pkj). Since L0(x) > 0, we have jI(pj;pk) ￿ pjj > jI(pj;pk) ￿ pkj.
The location of indi⁄erence determines the equilibrium locations of candidates
with relatively lower valences. Let Pk(pj) denote the best response correspondence
for candidate k. Then, if k receives a non-zero vote share in his best response, then







where ￿j = I(pj;pk) ￿ pj, ￿k = I(pj;pk) ￿ pk, and sgn(:) denotes the sign function.
Lemma 2 Candidate k￿ s best response correspondence always includes a location of
indi⁄erence. Furthermore, if Candidate k receives any votes in that location, then
jpj ￿ Pk(pj)j = L￿1(￿k), and, unless pj = 0, the best response correspondence is
single valued (where Pk(0) = fL￿1(￿k);￿L￿1(￿k)g).
Proof. Let us ￿x pj 6= 0. Now consider Candidate k￿ s ￿conditional￿best response,
P
+
k (pj) = fpk > pj : Vk(pj;pk) ￿ Vk(pj;p0
k) 8p0
k > pjg. For any pk > pj, Lemma 1.(ii)
implies I(pj;pk) > pj, and jI(pj;pk) ￿ pjj > jI(pj;pk) ￿ pkj. Thus, the denominator
of
@I(pj;pk)
@pk is positive, and the sign of
@I(pj;pk)
@pk is determined by the sign of I(pj;pk)￿





@pk . Now, if I = R, then for pk > I(pj;pk), we have
dVk
dpk < 0, and for
pk < I(pj;pk), we have
dVk
dpk > 0. But, by A1(ii), the only stable location for Candidate
k is that of the indi⁄erent voter, i.e., for pk = I(pj;pk) we have
dVk
dpk = 0. Then I(pj;pk)
is located L￿1(￿k) o⁄of the high-valence candidate. Thus, f(pj+L￿1(￿k)) > 0 implies
16P
+
k (pj) = pj + L￿1(￿k). If I 6= R, and f(pj + L￿1(￿k)) = 0, then we still have
pj +L￿1(￿k) 2 P
+
k (pj), as in this case any pk > pj results in Vk(pj;pk) = 0. Similarly,
maximizing Vk(pj;pk) conditional on pk < pj, implies that pj ￿ L￿1(￿k) 2 P
￿
k (pj)
(again with equality if f(pj ￿ L￿1(￿k)) > 0). Now, let us assume that Candidate
k receives a non-zero vote share, maxff(pj ￿ L￿1(￿k));f(pj + L￿1(￿k))g > 0. By




k (pj)) if and only if pj <(>)0. The
same assumption also implies that Vk(0;L￿1(￿k)) = Vk(0;￿L￿1(￿k)).
Hug (1995) derives the following result for L(x) = x2.
Lemma 3 When v2 > v1, in any LNE Candidate 2 should locate strictly between the
other two candidates.
Proof. Assume otherwise, i.e., that we have an LNE with non-zero vote shares
where both low valence candidates are located, say, at the right side of Candidate
2. By Lemma 1.(ii), p2 < I(p2;pj) for j 2 f1;3g. Then by (2),
@I(p2;pj)
@p2 > 0 for
j 2 f1;3g, i.e., by converging towards the others, Candidate 2 can increase his vote
share. Contradicting this was an LNE. Also note that if Candidate 2 shares his
location with the other candidate(s), then these candidate(s) would get zero votes,
again contradicting that these candidate(s) were receiving non-zero vote shares.
Now, without loss of generality, assume that in the equilibrium, Candidate 3 is




that at the policy platforms in Proposition 1, the low-valence candidates are not
competing with each other. That is because for any voter i, high-valence Candidate
2￿ s policy platform is closer than at least one low-valence candidate, so Candidate
2, when located between the other two candidates, ranks at worst as the second
candidate in any voter￿ s preference ordering. This observation implies that as long
as it is on the other side of Candidate 2, the location of the third candidate does
not have any e⁄ect on Candidate 1￿ s vote share, and thus Lemma 2 applies, i.e., the
location of indi⁄erence between a low valence and a high valence candidate is still the





We also need to show that Candidate 2 does not have any incentive to deviate from
p￿

























@p2 = 1. Then,










Equation 3 implies that p￿
1 = ￿p￿
3. Using this with Lemma 2, we have the LNE
platform in Proposition 1 as the only candidate for LNE. A su¢ cient condition for







































1). We assumed that L(:) 2 C2, then by implicit
function theorem, whenever it exists, I(p2;pj) is also locally C2. One can show that,





@p1 )2 ￿ L00(I(p2;p1) ￿ p1)(
@I(p2;p1))
@p2 )2





@p2 )2 ￿ L00(￿p2 + I(p2;p3))(
@I(p2;p3))
@p3 )2
[L0(￿p2 + I(p2;p3)) ￿ L0(I(p2;p3) ￿ p3)]2 :

































establishing the su¢ cient condition in Proposition 1, and completing the Proof of
Proposition 1.
18Proof of Proposition 2 In case (d), an LNE exists only when Candidates 1
and 2 share the same location, otherwise at least one of them has the incentive to
move towards the other one. Also note that the location Candidates 1 and 2 share
should be the mean point of the voters who vote for one of these strong candidates,
otherwise one of the high-valence candidates would move slightly to the side with
more voters and increase his vote share. By Lemma 2, Candidate 3￿ s platform (the
location of indi⁄erence) is a best response to the other candidates￿platform; having
two candidates with the same valence at the same location does not change the result
of Lemma 2. Thus, we have (i) p￿
1 = p￿







2 . None of the high-valence candidates has any incentive to move to the
left of z, as this would reduce that candidate￿ s vote share below F(z). The su¢ cient
condition guarantees that moving in￿nitesimally to the right does not increase a high-
valence candidate￿ s vote share either, i.e., limdp!0+ V2(z;z + dp;z + L￿1(￿3)) < 0.
To obtain the su¢ cient condition from this inequality, note that evaluating (2) at










Proof of Proposition 4 Note that by Propositions 1, 2, and 3 we know p￿
j
maximizes Vj(pj;p￿
￿j) locally for LNE and globally for PSNE. Here we need to show
that it maximizes Vj(pj;p￿
￿j) ￿ maxk6=jfVk(pj;p￿
￿j)g as well.
For part (i), consider the cases of (b) and (c) ￿rst. We need to show that a local
deviation by a candidate does not increase his plurality when the rest are located
at their LNE policy platforms. Let us consider a low valence candidate j who is
maximizing his plurality Vj(pj;p￿
￿j) ￿ Vk(pj;p￿
￿j). In his LNE location, his plurality
is either negative, i.e., k = 2, or equal to zero. Note, once more, that at his current
location this low-valence candidate is competing only against Candidate 2. Therefore
by a local deviation his plurality cannot increase. To see why, note that with any
such deviation Vj(pj;p￿
￿j) decreases (by the argument in the proof of Lemma 2, any
local deviations would decrease his vote share) and Vk(pj;p￿
￿j) either does not change,
18Of course, by symmetry, one could assume p￿
3 ￿ p￿






19i.e., k 6= 2 , or increases, i.e., k = 2. So, a plurality-maximizing low-valence candidate
has no incentive to locally deviate from his LNE location in Proposition 1. Now
let us check if the high-valence candidate has any incentive to locally deviate from
his LNE platform when he maximizes his plurality. Indeed, he has no incentive to
deviate either. To see why, assume without loss of generality that he deviates to
the right. Then his plurality is equal to V2(p2;p￿
￿2) ￿ V1(p2;p￿




￿2) for any p2 ￿ p￿








Now, let us prove (i) for case (d). Again, consider the low-valence candidate ￿rst.
Both high-valence candidates locate at the same platform and thus they share the
voters who do not vote for the low valence candidate. So, it is as if the low-valence
candidate is competing against one high valence candidate. Thus, when the formers
vote share decreases, so does his plurality. Then his LNE policy platform locally
maximizes his plurality. When we consider either of the high-valence candidates,
each has a plurality of zero in the equilibrium. If one of them moves to the left,
his vote share will decrease and the vote share of the other high-valence candidate
increases. But, the vote share of low-valence candidate will remain the same. Thus,
a local deviation to the left by a high-valence candidate, say, Candidate 2, decreases
his plurality. To see that a local deviation to the right by Candidate 2 is also
plurality-decreasing, note that, again, as we are considering an LNE platform, by
deviating, Candidate 2 cannot increase his vote share. Further, when Candidate 2
deviates to the right, the vote share of Candidate 1 increases. Thus, the plurality of
Candidate 2 decreases. Hence, for all possible valences, if (p￿
1;p￿
2;p￿
3) is an LNE under
vote-maximization, then it is an LNE under plurality-maximization.
For part (ii), we again use numerical simulations to show the existence of PSNE.
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